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Abstract 
Using a model of bivariate decision under risk, we analyse the health insurance demand  when 
there are two sources of risk: a health risk and an uninsurable one. We examine how the 
uninsurable risk affects the coverage of the health risk. We show that the determinants of the 
demand for health insurance are not only the correlation between the health and uninsurable 
risks as shown by Doherty and Schlesinger (1983a) and the variation of the marginal utility of 
wealth with respect to the health status (Rey, 2003) but also the way in which the occurrence of 
the uninsurable risk affects the marginal utility of wealth.  
 
Résumé 
En utilisant un modèle bivarié de décision dans le risque, nous analysons la demande 
d’assurance santé dans un contexte où un individu fait face à deux risques de nature différente : 
un risque de santé et un risque non assurable. Nous examinons l’impact d’un risque non  
assurable sur la couverture du risque de santé. Nous montrons que les principaux déterminants 
de la demande d’assurance santé sont non seulement la corrélation entre le risque de santé et le 
risque non assurable comme l’ont montré Doherty et Schlesinger (1983a) et l’utilité marginale 
de la richesse en fonction de l’état de santé (Rey, 2003) mais aussi la manière dont la 
réalisation du risque non assurable affecte l’utilité marginale de la richesse. 
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1 Introduction 
 
The analysis of the optimal health insurance was strongly influenced by three propositions. 
The first proposition is the Bernoulli principle. It states that risk-averse agents will choose full 
coverage when the premium is actuarially fair. The second proposition derives from by 
Mossin-Smith (1968). In their pioneering paper, Mossin-Smith (1968) showed that if the 
premium for insurance is loaded, the individual chooses less than full insurance. The third 
proposition is proposed by Arrow (1963). It states that a risk-averse agent will prefer a 
franchise contract to a coinsurance contract. 
Doherty and Schlesinger (1983a) show, in the presence of an uninsurable financial risk, that 
sufficient conditions for the validity of these propositions depend on the correlation between 
insurable and uninsurable risks. However, Doherty and Schlesinger (1983a) use a one-
argument utility function. Rey (2003) takes into account this limit by using a bivariate utility 
function. She shows that the determinants of the demand for health insurance are not only the 
correlation between the health and uninsurable risks but also the variation of the marginal 
utility of wealth with respect to the health status. However, Rey (2003) imposes restrictive 
assumptions on the health risk. She assumes that illness is characterized only by a decrease in 
health status. However, since there exist curative cares, which are costly for individuals, the 
health risk induces both a loss in the health status and a financial loss. This paper extents the 
result obtained by Rey (2003) to this framework. We also consider an uninsurable risk (For 
example an accident risk). The aim of this paper is to examine how the uninsurable risk affects 
the coverage of the health risk. 
We show that the optimal health insurance depends crucially on the way in which the 
occurrence of the uninsurable risk affects the marginal utility of wealth. 
The organization of this article is as follows. The next section introduces the model. The 
section that follows examines the optimal coinsurance contracts. Section 4 analyses the optimal 
insurance policy. The last section concludes. 
 
2 The model 
 
We consider an individual who derives utility from wealth W and from its health stock H. 
We use a Von Neumann Morgenstern two-arguments utility function U(W,H). We assume for  
 
 
 2
U standard concavity assumptions:  
U1 > 0, U2 > 0, U11 < 0, U22 < 0 and  U11 U22 –  (U12)2 > 0. 
We don’t impose any restriction on the sign of U12, the cross second derivative of U. 
The agent has an initial health stock H0, an initial wealth stock W0 and he becomes ill with a 
probability . The disease implies a health loss . In case of disease, there exist exogenous 
curative cares  at cost  for the individual.  
1p
L
D( )Lc
With a probability , the agent faces an uninsurable loss. We denote V(W,H) the utility 
function when the uninsurable loss occurs, with V(W,H) < U(W,H). Indeed, the realisation of 
the uninsurable loss always decreases the utility of wealth and health for risk-averse 
preferences (Cook and Graham (1977)). 
2p
We assume for V standard assumptions: V1 > 0, V2 > 0, V11 < 0, V22 < 0 and 
V11 V22 – (V12)
2
 > 0. 
We don’t impose any restriction on the sign of the variation of the marginal utility of wealth 
with respect to the uninsurable loss. Three cases are possible. 
 
- The occurrence of the uninsurable loss may leave the individual’s marginal utility of 
wealth unchanged: U (W,H) = V (W,H). In this case, the uninsurable loss does not 
effect the wealth uncertainty. 
1 1
 
- The occurrence of the uninsurable loss may increase the individual’s marginal utility of 
wealth: U (W,H) < V (W,H). In this case, the uninsurable loss plays as a hedge against 
wealth uncertainty. 
1 1
 
- The occurrence of the uninsurable loss may decrease the individual’s marginal utility of 
wealth: U (W,H) > V (W,H). In this case, the uninsurable loss plays as an amplifier of 
wealth uncertainty.  
1 1
 
 
 
 
 
 3
 3 Optimal Coinsurance Contracts 
 
To examine the optimal coinsurance contracts
4
, we consider a coinsurance health contract in 
which the insurance reimburses α ( )Lc  of the expense in health care. The premium for 
insurance level α  is ( )αP  =  (   ) 1pm+1 α ( )Lc , where  is the loading factor, 0. m m ≥
Four states of nature can appear. Utility levels and probabilities of occurrence are characterized 
as follows. 
State 1: U(W0 - ( )αP , H0)  no loss occurs 
State 2: U(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  c , H( )L 0 -  + ) only the insurable loss occurs D L
State 3: V (W0 - ( )αP , H0)  only the uninsurable loss occurs 
State 4: V(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  c , H( )L 0 -  + ) the two loss occurs. D L
 
We note Π  the probability of occurrence of state i (i = 1 ….4). i
They are defined as follows: 
1Π = 1- -  +  1p 2p 1p 1/2p
2Π =  (1 - ) 1p 1/2p
3Π =   -  2p 1p 1/2p
4Π =   1p 1/2p
Where  (resp. ) denotes the probability of occurrence of the insurable (resp. uninsurable) 
loss and  the conditional probability of the uninsurable loss given the insurable loss. 
1p
p
2p
1/2
We don’t impose restriction on the correlation between the losses. The tree cases are possible: 
the insurable loss and the uninsurable loss are independent (  = ), the insurable loss and 
the uninsurable loss are positively correlated (  < ) and the insurable loss and the 
uninsurable loss are negatively correlated (  > ). 
2p
1
1/2p
2p
1/2p
/2p
2p
The optimal level of insurance is solution of the following program: 
αmax ( )αE  =  U(W1Π 0 - ( )αP , H0) + 2Π  U(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + ) D L
            +  V(W3Π 0 - ( )αP , H0) +  V(W4Π 0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + )               (1) D L
                                                 
4 The optimal coinsurance contracts is the individual’s optimal insurance demand for given 
health expenditures. 
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 First order condition writes
5
: ( )α'E  =  c  [ (W1p ( )L 1Z 2, H0 -  + ) (1 - D L ( )m+1 1p ) -  (1 - )1p ( )m+1  (W1Z 1, H0) ] 
              + ( - ) {  [F1p 1/2p 2p ( )Lc ( m+1 ) 1p 1(W2, H0 -  + )- FD L 1(W1, H0)] 
                                                  - F1(W2, H0 -  + )}          (6) D L
Where:  
W1 =  W0 - ( )αP   et W2 = W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc  
 
Z(W, H) = (1 - ) U(W, H) +  V(W, H) 2p 2p
  
F(W,H) =  U(W, H) - V(W, H). 
 
To examine the optimal coinsurance contracts, we consider in turn two situations: the situation 
where the premium is actuarially fair ( )0=m  and the situation where the premium is 
loaded . ( )0>m
 
3.1 The premium is actuarially fair 
 
In this section, we examine optimal coinsurance contracts where the premium is actuarially fair 
. The actuarially fair insurance premium is such premium when the expected loss of the 
insurance company equals exactly the revenue from insurance premium. 
( 0=m )
Two situations are possible: the situation where the individual treats himself perfectly 
(  = ) and the situation where he does not (  < ). Firstly, let us consider the case where 
the individual treats himself perfectly (  = ). 
L D L D
L D
 
If the premium for insurance is actuarially fair then equation (6) may be written as: ( )α'E  =  c (1 - )  [ (W1p ( )L 1p 1Z 2, H0 -  + ) - (WD L 1Z 1, H0) ] 
              +  ( - ) {  [F1p 1/2p 2p ( )Lc 1p 1(W2, H0 -  + )- FD L 1(W1, H0)] 
                                                      -  F1(W2, H0 -  + )}                                                         (8) D L
From equation (8), we obtain in the case where the individual treats himself  
perfectly (  = ): L D
                                                 
5 see proof developped in Appendix 1. 
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 Proposition 1 (Complete curing) If the premium for insurance is actuarially fair ,  ( )0=m
the individual chooses full insurance ( = 1) if one of the following conditions is true: *α
- The insurable loss and the uninsurable loss are positively correlated (  > ) and the 
occurrence of the uninsurable loss increases the individual’s marginal utility of wealth  
1/2p 2p
(U  < V ).  1 1
- The insurable loss and the uninsurable loss are negatively correlated (  < ) and the 
occurrence of the uninsurable loss decreases the individual’s marginal utility of wealth  
1/2p 2p
(U  > V ). 1 1
 
Proof.  See appendix 2.1.  
 
Let us now turn to the case where the individual doesn’t treat himself perfectly (  < ). L D
We obtain: 
Proposition 2 (Partial curing) If the premium for insurance is actuarially fair ,  ( )0=m
the individual chooses full insurance ( = 1) if one of the following conditions is true: *α
- The insurable loss and the uninsurable loss are independent (  > ) and the cross 
derivative of U is negative or null (U
1/2p 2p
12 ≤  0). 
- The insurable loss and the uninsurable loss are positively correlated (  > ), the cross 
derivative of U is negative or null (U
1/2p 2p
12 ≤  0) and the occurrence of the uninsurable loss 
increases the individual’s marginal utility of wealth (U  < V ).  1 1
- The insurable loss and the uninsurable loss are negatively correlated (  < ), the cross 
derivative of U is negative or null (U
1/2p 2p
12 ≤  0) and the occurrence of the uninsurable loss 
decreases the individual’s marginal utility of wealth (U  > V ). 1 1
 
Proof.  See appendix 2.2.  
 
The positive sign of the cross derivative of  U (U12  > 0) means that the marginal utility of the 
composite material good (W) increases with health status (H) and reciprocally. 
Rey (2003) obtains that when the insurable and the uninsurable risks are negatively correlated 
and U12 < 0, full coverage is optimal if the premium is actuarially fair. We show that this result 
is true if the occurrence of the uninsurable loss increases the individual’s marginal utility of  
 6
 wealth. The sign of  the variation of the marginal utility of wealth with respect to the 
uninsurable loss is crucial when studying individual’s optimal insurance demand. 
 
3.2 The premium is loaded  
 
In this section we examine the individual’s optimal insurance demand when the premium for 
insurance is loaded ( ) . 0>m
Firstly, let us consider the case where the individual treats himself perfectly (  = ). L D
We obtain: 
Proposition 3 (Complete curing) If the premium for insurance is loaded , the 
individual chooses less than full insurance (  < 1) if one of the following conditions is true: 
( 0>m )
*α
-  =   1/2p 2p
- The insurable loss and the uninsurable loss are positively correlated (  > ) and the 
occurrence of the uninsurable loss decreases the individual’s marginal utility of wealth  
1/2p 2p
(U  > V ).  1 1
- The insurable loss and the uninsurable loss are negatively correlated (  < ) and the 
occurrence of the uninsurable loss increases the individual’s marginal utility of wealth  
1/2p 2p
(U  < V ). 1 1
 
Proof.  See appendix 2.3.  
Let us now turn to the case where the individual doesn’t treats himself perfectly (  < ). L D
We obtain: 
Proposition 4 (Partial curing) If the premium for insurance is loaded ( )0>m , the individual 
chooses less than full insurance (  < 1) if one of the following conditions is true: *α
-  =  and  U1/2p 2p 12  ≥ 0 
-  > , U1/2p 2p 12  ≥  0, U  > V and U  > V   1 1 12 12
-  < , U1/2p 2p 12  < 0, U  <  V and U  <  V . 1 1 12 12
 
Proof.  See appendix 2.4.  
Contrary to Rey (2003), the determinants of the demand for health insurance depend not only 
on the correlation between the insurable and the uninsurable losses risks and the variation of 
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the marginal utility of wealth with respect to the health status, but also on the way in which the 
occurrence of the uninsurable risk affects the marginal utility of wealth.  
 
4 Optimal Insurance Policy 
 
The Arrow theorem states that a risk-averse agent will prefer a franchise contract to a 
coinsurance contract.  
To examine the validity of this theorem to our framework, we extent our previous model to the 
case where the individual faces three losses: 
- a small health loss  SL
- a large health loss  LL
- an uninsurable loss 
We define six states of nature. Utility levels and probabilities of occurrence are characterized as 
follows: 
State 1: U(W0 , H0). No loss occurs. 
State 2: U(W0 - c , H( SL ))
)
)
0 -  + ). Only the insurable small health loss occurs. SD SL
State 3: U(W0 - c , H( LL 0 -  + ). Only the insurable large health loss occurs LD LL
State 4: V(W0 , H0). Only the uninsurable loss occurs. 
State 5: V(W0 - , H( SLc 0 - D  + ). The uninsurable and the insurable small health losses 
occurs. 
S SL
State 6: V(W0 - , H( LLc 0 - D  + ). The uninsurable and the insurable large health losses 
occurs. 
L LL
We note Π  the probability of occurrence of state i (i = 1 ….6). i
They are defined as follows: 
1Π = 1-  -  -  +  +  Sp Lp 2p Sp Sp /2 Lp Lp /2
2Π =  -  Sp Sp Sp /2
3Π =   -  Lp Lp Lp /2
4Π =   -  -  2p Sp Sp /2 Lp Lp /2
5Π =    Sp Sp /2
6Π =   Lp Lp /2
Where  and  denotes the probabilities of  and , respectively. Sp Lp SL LL
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We consider two insurance policies defined as follows: •  Franchise contract  ( ) ( )= otherwise                     0 6 and 3 statesin    SL L-cLcF  
F  is a deductible policy with deductible level ( )SLc . •  Coinsurance contract ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
 −+=
4 and 1 statesin                                                           0
6 and 3 statesin      1
5 and 2 statesin                                               
SLS
S
LcLc α - f  Lα c
 Lα  c
C  
C  is a proportional basis policy. 
However, coinsurance and franchise contracts are available at the same premium. We obtain: 
P  = α ( )SLc  (  + ) + (1-Sp Lp ( )αf ) [ ( )LLc - ( )SLc ]  =  [Lp ( )LLc - c ]  .    ( )SL Lp( ) ( )( ) ( )  + −= SLLL S ppLcLc Lcf     1       with  αα 6. 
 
The optimal level of coinsurance is solution of the following program: 
*α = arg αmax ( )αE =  1Π  U(W0 - P  , H0) + 2Π U(W0 - P  - ( )α−1 ( )SLc , H0 -  + )  SD SL
                                   +  U(W3Π 0 - P  -  − αLSpp1 ( )LLc , H0 -  + ) LD LL
   + Π  V(W4 0- P  , H0) 
   + Π  V(W5 0 - P  - ( )α−1 ( )SLc , H0 -  + ) SD SL
   + Π  V(W6 0 - P  -  − αLSpp1 ( )SLc -, H0 -  + )                       (15) SD SL
First order condition writes: ( )α'E  = (W( )SLc 2Π 1U 0 - P  - ( )α−1 ( )SLc , H0 -  + ) SD SL
             -   LSpp ( )SLc 3Π  U (W1 0 - P  -  − αLSpp1 ( )LLc , H0 -  + ) LD LL
            +  V (W5Π ( )SLc 1 0 - P  - ( )α−1 ( )SLc , H0 -  + ) SD SL
           +  6Π  LSpp ( )SLc  V  (W1 0 - P  -  − αLSpp1 ( )SLc -, H0 -  + )         (16) SD SL
                                                 
6 see proof developped in Appendix 3. 
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Proposition 5 The Arrow theorem only holds when one of the following conditions is true: 
- U  = V  1 1
- U  = V  = 0 12 12
- U  < 0 and V  > 0 12 12
 
Proof.  See appendix 4.  
 
Proposition 5 shows the importance of the knowledge of the way in which the occurrence of 
the uninsurable risk affects the marginal utility of wealth to determine the optimal insurance 
policy. 
 
5 CONCLUSION 
 
In this article, we view health insurance as a combined hedge against the two consequences of 
falling ill: treatment expenditures and loss in health status. We use a bivariate utility function 
depending both on the wealth and health. We don’t impose any restriction on the sign of the 
variation of the marginal utility of wealth with respect to the uninsurable loss. We have shown 
that it is difficult to obtain classical results of insurance theory in the health case. We have 
concluded that the determinants of the demand for health insurance are not only the correlation 
between the health and uninsurable risks and the variation of the marginal utility of wealth with 
respect to the health status but also the way in which the occurrence of the uninsurable risk 
affects the marginal utility of wealth.  
 
Appendix 
 
Appendix 1 
 
The optimal level of insurance is solution of the following program: 
αmax ( )αE  =  U(W1Π 0 - ( )αP , H0) + 2Π  U(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + ) D L
            +  V(W3Π 0 - ( )αP , H0) +  V(W4Π 0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + )               (1) D L
Where: ( )αP = (1 + )  m 1p α ( )Lc  denote the premium for insurance. 
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 Replacing the probabilities by their expressions, equation (1) writes as follows: ( )αE  = { [(1 - ) U(W1p 2p 0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + ) D L
                 +  V(W2p 0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + )] D L
                 + (1 - )[(1 - ) U(W1p 2p 0 - ( )αP , H0) +  V(W2p 0 - ( )αP , H0)]}                                                        
  + { ( - )  [U(W1p 1/2p 2p 0 - ( )αP , H0)- V(W0 - ( )αP , H0) - U(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1 ( )Lc , H0 -  + ) D L
                                                                         + V(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + )]}  (2)   D L
 
Or in a more compact form: ( )αE  = {  Z(W1p 0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  , H( )Lc 0 -  + ) + (1 - ) Z(WD L 1p 0 - ( )αP , H0)}   
               +{ ( - )[F(W1p 1/2p 2p 0 - ( )αP , H0)- F(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + )]}       (3) D L
Where: 
  
Z(W, H) = (1 - ) U(W, H) +  V(W, H) 2p 2p
  
A( ,W,H) = ( - )  [U(W1/2p 1p 1/2p 2p 0 - ( )αP , H0)- V(W0 - ( )αP , H0) 
                                                  - U(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + ) D L
                                                  + V(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + )] D L
 
F(W,H) =  U(W, H) - V(W, H). 
Consequently, the optimal level of insurance is solution of the following program: 
*α = arg αmax ( )αE  = {  Z(W1p 0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + )  D L
                            + (1 - ) Z(W1p 0 - ( )αP ,H0)}   
                            + { ( - )[F(W1p 1/2p 2p 0 - ( )αP , H0)- F(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  , H( )Lc 0 -  + )]} (4)          D L
 
First order condition writes: ( )α'E  =  c  [ (W1p ( )L 1Z 0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + ) (1 - D L ( )m+1  )  1p
                                -  (1 - )  (W1p ( m+1 ) 1Z 0 - ( )αP , H0)] 
      +  ( - ) {1p 1/2p 2p ( )m+1    [F( )Lc 1p 1(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + )- FD L 1(W0 - ( )αP , H0)] 
                                    - c  F( )L 1(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + )}                               (5)                       D L
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Equation (5) can be written as follows: ( )α'E  =  c  [ (W1p ( )L 1Z 2, H0 -  + ) (1 - D L ( )m+1 1p ) -  (1 - )1p ( )m+1  (W1Z 1, H0) ] 
   + ( - ) {    [F1p 1/2p 2p ( )m+1 ( )Lc 1p 1(W2, H0 -  + )- FD L 1(W1, H0)]- ( )Lc  F1(W2, H0 -  + )} (6) D L
Where: W1 =  W0 - ( )αP   et W2 = W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc  
 
Second order condition writes: ( )α''E  = {  1Π ( )21 m+ ( )21p  (  U( ) 2Lc ) 11(W0 - ( )αP , H0)  
                +   [ ]  U2Π ( )( )2Lc ( ) 2111 pm+− 11(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + ) D L
                +     V3Π ( )21 m+ ( )21p ( )( 2Lc ) 11(W0 - ( )αP , H0)        
                +    V4Π ( )( )2Lc ( )[ ]2111 pm+− 11(W0 - ( )αP - ( )α−1  ( )Lc , H0 -  + )} < 0           (7) D L
  
The second order condition is satisfied because ( )α''E  is always negative. 
 
Appendix 2 
 
Appendix 2.1 
The strict concavity of ( )αE  ensures that full coverage is optimal (  = 1) if  and only if 
the first-order condition for maximizing 
*α( )αE  evaluated at full coverage is nonnegative: 
 = 1 0. *α ⇔ ( )1'E ≥( )1'E  writes:  ( )1'E  =   - ( - )  [U1p 1/2p 2p ( )Lc 1(W0 - 1p ( )Lc , H0)- V1(W0 - 1p ( )Lc , H0)]   (9) 
 
If  =              then               < 1 1/2p 2p
*α
                                                         
If  >               then             1/2p 2p
*α  11 11 V >  Uif 1 < V < Uif 1 =
 
If  <             then                    1/2p 2p
*α  <> 11 11 V   Uif 1 < V  Uif 1 =
                                                                
 12
  
 
Appendix 2.2 
 
The strict concavity of ( )αE  ensures that full coverage is optimal (  = 1) if  and only if 
the first-order condition for maximizing 
*α( )αE  evaluated at full coverage is nonnegative: 
 = 1 0. *α ⇔ ( )1'E ≥( )1'E  writes:  ( )1'E  =  (1 - )  [ Z (W1p 1p ( )Lc 1 0 - 1p ( )Lc , H0 -  + ) - ( WD L 1Z 0 - 1p ( )Lc , H0) ]  
       - ( - )  [(1- ) F1p 1/2p 2p ( )Lc 1p 1(W0 - 1p ( )Lc , H0 -  + ) +  FD L 1p 1(W0 - , H1p ( )Lc 0)]   (10) 
 
However, the sign of U12 is equal to the sign of Z12. 
 
From the equation (10), we obtain: 
If  =               then           1/2p 2p
*α  >< ≤ 0     Uif 1 0     Uif 1 = 1212
If  >               then                                                                  1/2p 2p
*α  ≤ 1112 1112 V >   Uand 0 >   Uif 1 < V <   Uand 0    Uif 1 =
If  <               then           1/2p 2p
*α  <>≤ 1112 1112 V    Uand 0 >   Uif 1 < V    Uand 0    Uif 1 =
 
Appendix 2.3 
 
The strict concavity of ( )αE  ensures that full coverage is optimal (  = 1) if  and only if 
the first-order condition for maximizing 
*α( )αE  evaluated at full coverage is nonnegative: 
 = 1 0. *α ⇔ ( )1'E ≥( )1'E  writes:  ( )1'E  =  - [ (Wm 1Z 0 - , H1p ( )Lc 0 ) +  ( - ) 1p 1/2p 2p ( )Lc  F1(W0 - 1p ( )Lc , H0)]         (11) 
From the equation (10), we obtain: 
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If  =              then              < 1 1/2p 2p
*α
If  >               then             1/2p 2p
*α  11 11V >  Uif 1 < V < Uif possible is 1 =
If  <             then                  1/2p 2p
*α  < >11 11V   Uif 1 < V  Uif possible is 1 =
                                                           
Appendix 2.4 
 
The strict concavity of ( )αE  ensures that full coverage is optimal (  = 1) if  and only if 
the first-order condition for maximizing 
*α( )αE  evaluated at full coverage is nonnegative: 
 = 1 0. *α ⇔ ( )1'E ≥( )1'E  writes: ( )1'E  =  (1 - ) (  [ Z (W1p ) 1m+1 2, H0 -  + ) - (WD L 1Z 1, H0) ] -  (Wm 1Z 2, H0 -  + ) D L
  + ( - ) {1p 1/2p 2p ( )Lc ( )m+1   [F1p 1(W2, H0 -  + )- FD L 1(W1, H0)] 
                                     - F1(W2, H0 -  + )}                (12) D L
However, the sign of U12 is equal to the sign of Z12. 
From the equation (8), we obtain: 
If  =             then              1/2p 2p
*α  ≥< <0     Uif 1 0     Uif possible is 1 = 12 12
If  >             then             1/2p 2p
*α  >>≥ <<<  V    Uand V  U0,    Uif 1 <    V    Uand V  U0,    Uif possible is 1 = 12121112 12121112
If  <             then             1/2p 2p
*α  <<< >>≥  V    Uand V  U0,    Uif 1 <    V    Uand V  U0,    Uif possible is 1 = 12121112 12121112
 
Appendix 3 
 
We consider two insurance policies defined as follows: •  Franchise contract  ( ) ( )= otherwise                     0 6 and 3 statesin    SL L-cLcF  
F  is a deductible policy with deductible level ( )SLc . 
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 •  Coinsurance contract ( )( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
 −+=
4 and 1 statesin                                                           0
6 and 3 statesin      1
5 and 2 statesin                                               
SLS
S
LcLc α - f  Lα c
 Lα  c
C  
C  is a proportional basis policy. 
 
In the case of a coinsurance contract, the profit of the insurance company is defined as 
follows: 
State 1  ≡ P                                                                     with 1Π  
State 2  ≡ P  - α ( )SLc            with 2Π  
State 3  ≡ P  - [α ( SLc ) + (1- ( )αf ) [ ( )LLc - ( )SLc ]]   with 3Π  
State 4  ≡ P              with 4Π  
State 5≡ P  - α ( )SLc                       with 5Π  
State 6≡ P  - [α ( SLc ) + (1- ( )αf ) [ ( )LLc - ( )SLc ]]     with 6Π  
E ( )π  = P  - [α ( )SLc  (  + ) + (1-Sp Lp ( )αf ) [ ( )LLc - ( )SLc ] ] Lp
However, E ( )π  = 0 
Thus P  = α ( )SLc  (  + ) + (1-Sp Lp ( )αf ) [ ( )LLc - ( )SLc ]        (13) Lp
 
In the case of a franchise contract, the profit of the insurance company is defined as 
follows: 
State 1  ≡ P                                                                  with 1Π  
State 2  ≡ P                               with 2Π  
State 3  ≡ P  - [ - ]                                     with ( )LLc ( SLc ) 3Π  
State 4  ≡ P           with 4Π  
State 5≡ P                        with 5Π  
State 6 ≡ P  - [ -( )LLc ( )SLc ]                                       with 6Π  
E ( )π  = P  - [ -( )LLc ( )SLc ]  Lp
However, E ( )π = 0 thus P  = [ -( )LLc ( )SLc ]       (14) Lp
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 However, coinsurance and franchise contracts are available at the same premium. We 
obtain: 
P  = α ( )SLc  (  + ) + (1-Sp Lp ( )αf ) [ ( )LLc - ( )SLc ]    =  [Lp ( )LLc - c ] .    ( )SL Lp( ) ( )( ) ( )  + −= SLLL S ppLcLc Lcf     1       with  αα  
 
Appendix 4 
 
The Arrow theorem holds only if ( )0'V ≤ 0. ( )0'V  =  [U (W( )SLc Sp 1 0 - P  - , H( SLc ) 0 -  + ) - U  (WSD SL 1 0 - P  - ( )SLc , H0 -  + )] LD LL
                   - 
 [V  (W1 0 - P  - ( )SLc , H0 -  + ) - V  (WSD SL 1 0 - P  - ( )SLc , H0 -  + )]ν           (17) LD LL
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